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Abstract. The security provided by the XCBC, TMAC and OMAC
schemes is analysed and compared with other MAC schemes. In particu-
lar, ‘partial’ key recovery attacks against all three of these schemes are de-
scribed, yielding upper bounds on the effective security level. The results
imply that there is relatively little to be gained practically through the
introduction of these schemes by comparison with other well-established
MAC functions.
1 Introduction
In this paper the security of three related methods for computing Message Au-
thentication Codes (MACs) is analysed and compared with the level of secu-
rity provided by other, more well-established, MACing techniques. The security
analysis is given in terms of the most efficient (known) forgery and key recovery
attacks that can be launched against the schemes.
The three MAC schemes considered here are known as XCBC [1], OMAC
[2] and TMAC [3] (see also [4]). These three schemes are all examples of CBC-
MACs, i.e. they are all based on the use of a block cipher in Cipher Block
Chaining Mode — see, for example, [5]. Various CBC-MAC schemes have been
in wide use for many years for protecting the integrity and guaranteeing the
origin of data.
Note that all three of these new schemes have been specifically designed for
use with messages of variable length, with the goal of minimising the number of
block cipher operations required to compute a MAC. We compare the efficiency
and security of these MAC schemes with two other schemes also designed for
messages of arbitrary length, namely EMAC [6] and the ANSI retail MAC [7],
also known as MAC algorithms 2 and 3 (respectively) from ISO/IEC 9797-1 [8].
2 Key Recovery and Forgery Attacks
There are two main classes of attack on a MAC scheme, namely key recovery
attacks, in which an attacker is able to discover the secret key used to compute
the MACs, and forgery attacks in which an attacker is able to determine the
correct MAC for a message (without a legitimate key holder having generated
it). Key recovery attacks are clearly more powerful than forgery attacks since
once the key is known arbitrary forgeries are possible. We also consider partial
key recovery attacks in which an attacker is able to obtain part of the secret key.
Using a simplified version of the approach of [8], we use a three-tuple [a, b, c]
to quantify the resources needed for an attack, where a denotes the number of
off-line block cipher encipherments (or decipherments), b denotes the number
of known data string/MAC pairs, and c denotes the number of chosen data
string/MAC pairs. In each case, the resources given are those necessary to ensure
that an attack has a probability of successful completion greater than 0.5.
3 XCBC and Some Simple Attacks
The XCBC scheme was originally proposed by Black and Rogaway in 2000 [1],
with the objective of providing a provably secure CBC-MAC scheme which min-
imises the number of block cipher encryptions and decryptions.
3.1 Definition
The XCBC scheme operates as follows. First (as throughout) suppose that the
underlying block cipher transforms an n-bit block of plaintext into an n-bit block
of ciphertext (i.e. it is an n-bit block cipher), and that it uses a key of k bits.
If X is an n-bit block then we write eK(X) (or dK(X)) for the block cipher
encryption (or decryption) of the n-bit block X using key K.
The XCBC MAC scheme uses a triple of keys (K1, K2, K3) where K1 is a
block cipher key, i.e. it contains k bits, and K2, K3 are both n-bit strings. The
XCBC MAC computation is as follows.
The message D on which the MAC is to be computed is padded and split into
a sequence of q n-bit blocks: D1, D2, . . . , Dq. Note that there are two possibilities
for the padding process. If the bit-length of the message is already an integer
multiple of n then no padding is performed. However, if the bit-length of the
message is not a multiple of n then the padded message consists of the message
concatenated with a single one bit followed by the minimal number of zeros
necessary to make the bit-length of the padded message a multiple of n. (Note
that this padding strategy is not a 1-1 mapping of messages to padded messages;
however, problems are avoided by the use of two different MAC computation
strategies, as described immediately below).
The computation of the MAC depends on whether or not padding has been
necessary. In the first case, i.e. where no padding is necessary, the MAC compu-
tation is as follows:
H1 = eK1(D1),
Hi = eK1(Di ⊕Hi−1), (2 ≤ i ≤ q − 1), and
MAC = eK1(Dq ⊕Hq−1 ⊕K2).
In the second case, i.e. where padding is applied, the MAC computation is
as follows:
H1 = eK1(D1),
Hi = eK1(Di ⊕Hi−1), (2 ≤ i ≤ q − 1), and
MAC = eK1(Dq ⊕Hq−1 ⊕K3).
That is, the keys K2 and K3 are ex-ored with the final plaintext block de-
pending on whether or not padding is necessary.
Note that the MAC used will be truncated to the left-most m bits of the
MAC value given in the above equation, where m ≤ n. In this paper we only
consider the case where m = n, i.e. where no truncation is performed.
Before proceeding we observe that other authors have also considered the
security of XCBC and related schemes. In particular, Furuya and Sakurai [9]
have considered various attacks against 2-key variants of XCBC. However, some
of the previous work (including that in [9]) has focussed on weaknesses arising
from particular choices for the underlying block cipher. This contrasts with the
approach followed in this paper which considers attacks independent of the block
cipher. Note also that the attacks described below do not contradict the proofs
of security for XCBC, TMAC and OMAC — they simply establish the tightness
of the results; nevertheless, the existence of ‘partial key recovery attacks’, as
described herein, is something that is both undesirable and not evident from
theoretical analysis of the schemes.
3.2 Forgery Attacks on XCBC
Suppose a fixed key triple (K1, K2, K3) is in use for computing XCBC-MACs.
Let D1, D2, . . . , Dq be any sequence of n-bit blocks, where q ≥ 0 is arbitrary.
Suppose (by some means) an attacker learns the MACs for 2n/2 different mes-
sages which, after padding and splitting into a sequence of n-bit blocks, all have
q+1 blocks, and whose first q blocks are D1, D2, . . . , Dq; i.e. all the padded mes-
sages have the form D1, D2, . . . , Dq, X, for some n-bit block X. Because padding
has been applied the MACs will all be computed using the key K3. (Note that,
since padding is applied, all of these messages must have unpadded bit-length `
satisfying qn < ` < (q + 1)n).
Suppose that the attacker also has the MACs for a further 2n/2 different
messages to which padding is not applied and which, after division into a se-
quence of n-bit blocks, have the form D1, D2, . . . , Dq, Y , for some n-bit block
Y . Because padding has not been applied, the MACs will all be computed using
the key K2. Note that, since no padding is applied, all these messages will have
length precisely (n+ 1)q bits.
The total number of message/MAC pairs required is clearly 2n/2+1. In the
discussion below we ‘cheat’ slightly and refer to these as ‘known MACs’ rather
than ‘chosen MACs’. The justification for this is that if q = 0 then we do not
impose any conditions on the messages for which MACs are required (except for
their lengths). Also, there may be applications where the first part of a message
is fixed, and only the last block is variable — again in such a case the required
message/MAC pairs can be obtained without choosing the messages.
By the usual birthday paradox probability arguments (see, for example, Sect.
2.1.5 of [5] or [10]), with a probability of approximately 1−e−1 ' 0.63 one of the
MACs from the first set of messages will equal one of the MACs from the second
set. Suppose the pair of messages concerned are respectively D1, D2, . . . , Dq, X∗
and D1, D2, . . . , Dq, Y ∗ for some n-bit blocks X∗ and Y ∗.
Before proceeding, suppose that Q is the ‘simple’ CBC-MAC for the q-block
message D1, D2, . . . , Dq, i.e. if
H1 = eK1(D1), and
Hi = eK1(Di ⊕Hi−1), (2 ≤ i ≤ q)
then Q = Hq.
Then, by definition, we immediately have that
eK1(Q⊕X∗ ⊕K3) = eK1(Q⊕ Y ∗ ⊕K2).
Hence, since encryption with a fixed key is a permutation of the set of all n-bit
blocks, we have Q⊕X∗⊕K3 = Q⊕Y ∗⊕K2, i.e. X∗⊕Y ∗ = K2⊕K3. That is, the
attacker has learnt the value of K2 ⊕K3. Knowledge of this value immediately
enables forgeries to be computed.
Specifically, suppose (D1, D2, . . . , Dq) is the padded version of a message (of
unpadded length ` satisfying (q−1)n < ` < qn) for which the MACM is known.
Then the unpadded message (D1, D2, . . . , Dq ⊕ K2 ⊕ K3) also has MAC M .
The overall complexity of this forgery attack is [0, 2n/2+1, 0].
Note that the above is, in some sense, also a partial key recovery attack, since
the attacker has reduced the number of unknown key bits from k+2n to k+ n.
However, to simplify the presentation below we do not consider this further here.
3.3 Key Recovery Attacks on XCBC
We describe two main types of key recovery attack. The first attack (essentially
based on the Preneel-van Oorschot attack [11, 12]) requires a significant number
of known MACs and ‘only’ 2k block cipher operations. The second attack (a
‘meet-in-the-middle’ attack) requires minimal numbers of known MACs, but
potentially larger numbers of block cipher operations (and more storage).
The first attack is as follows. Suppose an attacker knows the MACs for 2n/2
different messages of length less than n bits. Thus, after padding and division
into n-bit blocks, all these messages will consist of one block. Suppose the at-
tacker also knows the MACs for a further 2n/2 different messages of bit-length `
satisfying n < ` < 2n, i.e. messages which, after padding, contain two blocks.
Exactly as above, there is a good chance (probability ' 0.63) that a message
from the first set will have the same MAC as a message from the second set.
Suppose that the one-block and two-block messages concerned are X and (Y ,
Z) respectively. Since both messages involve padding, key K3 is used in both
cases. Then we know that
eK1(K3 ⊕X) = eK1(K3 ⊕ Z ⊕ eK1(Y )).
Hence, since eK1 is a permutation on the set of all n-bit blocks, we haveK3⊕X =
K3 ⊕Z ⊕ eK1(Y ), i.e. X ⊕Z = eK1(Y ). It is now possible (at least in principle)
to perform an exhaustive search through all possible values for K1, and as long
as k < n it is likely that only the correct value will satisfy this equation. If
k ≥ n then a number of ‘false’ matches will be found — however, these can be
eliminated in the next stage with minimal effort.
Given a candidate forK1, any of the known MACs for one-block messages can
be decrypted using this value of K1 to reveal the value of K3. This candidate
key pair can then be tested on a further known MAC, and all false keys can
quickly be eliminated (the complexity of this step does not affect the overall
attack complexity since it is only conducted when a candidate for K1 is found,
which will only happen occasionally). The total expected complexity of this first
key recovery attack is thus [2k, 2n/2+1, 0], since the correct key will certainly be
found by the time an exhaustive search of the key space is complete (given that
a MAC collision has been found).
For the second attack we present just one variant (many other meet-in-the-
middle variants exist). Suppose that the attacker has access to d(k + n)/ne
known single-block message/MAC pairs all of which involve no padding (and
hence K2 is used), together with a single known message/MAC pair for which
padding is applied, i.e. a total of d(k + 2n)/ne known MACs. One interesting
point regarding the attack we now describe is that negligible storage is required,
unlike similar attacks on EMAC (although this would no longer be true if the
messages contained more than one block).
The attacker chooses a single-block message for which padding is not used —
suppose the message is D and the MAC is M . The attacker first goes through
all 2k possible values for the key K1 and computes dK∗1 (M) ⊕ D = K∗2 for
each candidate value K∗1 . The pair (K
∗
1 , K
∗
2 ) is then tested as a candidate for
(K1, K2) using a second known message/MAC pair for which padding was not
used. This will require a single block cipher operation, and almost all incorrect
candidate key pairs will be eliminated. By means of further tests against known
message/MAC pairs (from the set of d(k + n)/ne), with high probability all
but the correct key pair can be eliminated. The single remaining known MAC
can be used to derive K3. The total complexity of this attack is thus [2k+1,
d(k + 2n)/ne, 0]. (Note that this attack requires only four times as many block
cipher operations as the previous attack, and requires only a handful of known
MACs compared to a very large number for the previous attack).
4 TMAC and Its Security
The TMAC scheme, a simple variant of XCBC, was proposed by Kurosawa and
Iwata [2] with the goal of reducing the number of required keys from three to
two.
4.1 Definition of TMAC
The TMAC scheme operates in exactly the same way as XCBC except that it
only uses a key pair (K, K ′) instead of a key triple, where K is a k-bit block
cipher key and K ′ contains n bits. A key triple (K1, K2, K3), as used by XCBC,
is then derived from (K, K ′) by setting K1 = K, K2 = u.K ′ and K3 = K ′,
where u is a constant (defined in [2]) and multiplication by u takes place in a
specific representation of the finite field of 2n elements (also specified in [2]).
4.2 Forgery Attacks on TMAC
Clearly the forgery attack on XCBC described in Sect. 3.2 will also apply to
TMAC. There does not appear to be any obvious way in which to take advantage
of the added structure in TMAC to make such an attack more efficient.
4.3 Key Recovery Attacks on TMAC
Again, both the key recovery attacks on XCBC described in Sect. 3.3 will also
apply to TMAC.
There also exists a partial key recovery attack which will yield the key K ′
rather more simply than the entire key can be obtained — most importantly
this attack does not require a search through the entire key space.
Suppose that the attacker performs the forgery attack described in Sect. 3.2.
Then, the attacker will learn the value of K2⊕K3 = S, say. However, in the case
of TMAC, we also know that K2 = u.K3, where multiplication by the public
constant u is defined over the finite field of 2n elements. Thus K3 = S.(u+1)−1,
and hence the attacker can learn the values of both K2 and K3. The total
complexity of this partial key recovery attack is thus the same as that of the
forgery attack, i.e. [0, 2n/2+1, 0]. (Note that this yields another full key recovery
attack with complexity [2k−1, 2n/2+1, 0]).
Before proceeding we consider the implications of knowledge of K2 and K3.
At first glance it is not obvious that this is any worse than knowing the value of
K2⊕K3, which already enables simple forgeries. However, it is more serious since
it enables a far wider range of forgeries to be performed. For example, suppose the
(unpadded) messageD1, D2, . . . , Dq has MACM , i.e.M = eK1(K2⊕Dq⊕Hq−1),
where Hq−1 is defined as above. Then, if message E1, E2, . . . , Er has MAC N ,
it is not hard to see that the message
D1, D2, . . . , Dq−1, Dq ⊕K2, E1 ⊕M,E2, E3, . . . , Er
also has MAC N .
Finally note that this partial key recovery attack against TMAC has previ-
ously been described by Sung, Hong and Lee [13].
4.4 Improving TMAC
The main reason that TMAC is significantly weaker than XCBC is the fact that
a simple algebraic relationship exists between K2 and K3. This not only enables
K2 to be trivially deduced from K3 (and vice versa), it also enables a second
linear equation in K2 and K3 to be used to deduce both K2 and K3.
However, there is no reason for such a simple relationship to exist betweenK2
and K3. One way of avoiding this would be to cryptographically derive both K2
and K3 from the single key K ′. One way in which this could be done would be to
define two different fixed n-bit strings, S2 and S3 say, and to put K2 = eK′(S2)
and K3 = eK′(S3). With this definition, knowledge of one of K2 (or K3) will not
enable K3 (or K2) to be deduced, as long as the block cipher e resists known
ciphertext attacks. Also, knowledge of K2 ⊕K3 will also not enable K2 and K3
to be deduced (again assuming that e resists known ciphertext attacks). This
change would, however, mean that K ′ contains k rather than n bits.
Of course, this change invalidates the security proof for TMAC. Moreover,
an analogous change proposed for OMAC (see Sect. 5.4) has been criticised by
Iwata and Kurosawa [14, 15].
5 The Security of OMAC
The OMAC scheme, a further simple variant of XCBC, was proposed by Iwata
and Kurosawa [3] with the goal of further reducing the number of required keys
from three to one. This scheme has recently been adopted by NIST under the
title of CMAC [16].
5.1 Definition of OMAC
The OMAC scheme operates in exactly the same way as XCBC except that it
only uses a single key K instead of a key triple, where K is a k-bit block cipher
key. A key triple (K1, K2, K3), as used by XCBC, is then derived from K by
setting L = eK(0n), K1 = K, K2 = u.L and K3 = u2.L, where 0n is the n-bit
block of all zeros, and u is a constant (defined in [3]) and multiplication by u
and u2 takes place in a specific representation of the finite field of 2n elements
(also specified in [3]).
Note that there are, in fact, two different variants of OMAC, known as
OMAC1 and OMAC2. The version defined above is OMAC1, and is the one
analysed here. However the analysis is almost identical for OMAC2, which is
identical to OMAC1 except that K3 = u−1.L.
5.2 Forgery Attacks on OMAC
Just as for TMAC, the forgery attack on XCBC described in Sect. 3.2 will also
apply to OMAC. There does not appear to be any obvious way in which to
take advantage of the added structure in OMAC to make such an attack more
efficient.
5.3 Key Recovery Attacks on OMAC
Both the key recovery attacks on XCBC described in Sect. 3.3 will also apply
to OMAC, as will a simple variant of the partial key recovery attack described
in Sect. 4.3. In this case however, a second partial key recovery attack exists,
which we now describe. This attack is designed to enable L to be determined,
knowledge of which immediately enables both K2 and K3 to be determined. The
attack is similar to that described in Sect. 3.3.
Suppose an attacker knows the MACs for 2n/2 different messages of length
less than n bits. Thus, after padding and division into n-bit blocks, all these
messages will consist of one block. Suppose the attacker also knows the MACs
for a further 2n/2 different messages of bit-length ` satisfying n < ` < 2n, i.e.
messages which, after padding, contain two blocks, and for which the first n bits
are all zero.
Exactly as above, there is a good chance (probability ' 0.63) that a message
from the first set will have the same MAC as a message from the second set.
Suppose that the one-block and two-block messages concerned are X and (0n,
Z) respectively (recall that the second message must begin with n zeros). Since
both messages involve padding, key K3 is used in both cases. Then we know
that
eK1(K3 ⊕X) = eK1(K3 ⊕ Z ⊕ eK1(0n)).
Hence, since eK1 is a permutation on the set of all n-bit blocks, we haveK3⊕X =
K3 ⊕ Z ⊕ eK1(0n), i.e. X ⊕ Z = eK1(0n). But K1 = K, and thus we know that
L = X ⊕ Z. Thus L, and hence K2 and K3, are immediately available to the
attacker. This latter attack has complexity [0, 2n/2, 2n/2].
5.4 Improving OMAC
Analogously to the proposed improvements to TMAC (given in Sect. 4.4), one
possibility would be to derive K2 and K3 from K using the following process:
put K2 = eK(S2) and K3 = eK(S3), where S2 and S3 are fixed and distinct
n-bit strings. This will avoid the attack described in Sect. 4.3. In addition, in
order to avoid the OMAC-specific attack described in Sect. 5.3, it is suggested
that the key K1 used in MAC computations should not be the same as the key
used to derive K2 and K3, to prevent MAC computations accidentally revealing
K2 and/or K3. This is simple to achieve by setting K1 = K⊕S1 for a fixed k-bit
string S1.
However, we note that the above simple approach to modifying OMAC has
been criticised by Iwata and Kurosawa [14, 15], who show that a proof of security
cannot be obtained for the modified scheme using the ‘standard’ assumptions
about the underlying block cipher. This suggests that it would be interesting
to develop variants of TMAC and OMAC for which proofs of security can be
readily developed, and which nevertheless do not permit ‘partial key recovery
attacks’ of the type described.
6 Benchmark Results and Comparisons
We next consider the security provided by two well-known and standardised
CBC-MAC schemes, namely EMAC and the ANSI retail MAC. Note that, unlike
XCBC, TMAC and OMAC, these schemes operate independently of whether or
not a message is padded and how padding is performed.
6.1 EMAC
EMAC is standardised as MAC algorithm 2 in ISO/IEC 9797-1 [8], and has been
proven secure by Petrank and Rackoff [17]. EMAC uses a pair of keys (K1, K2)
where K1 and K2 are both block cipher keys, i.e. they contain k bits. A message
D is first padded and split into a sequence of q n-bit blocks: D1, D2, . . . , Dq.
The EMAC computation, which essentially involves double encrypting the
final block, is as follows:
H1 = eK1(D1),
Hi = eK1(Di ⊕Hi−1), (2 ≤ i ≤ q − 1), and
MAC = eK2(eK1(Dq ⊕Hq−1)).
As summarised in [8], the most effective (known) forgery attack against
EMAC has complexity [0, 2n/2, 1] and the best key recovery attacks have com-
plexity either [2k+1, 2n/2, 0] or [s.2k, d2k/ne, 0] (for some small value of s),
where the second attack requires O(2k) storage. Note that the second attack is
a meet-in-the-middle attack.
6.2 ANSI Retail MAC
The ANSI retail MAC (abbreviated as ARMAC below) is standardised as MAC
algorithm 3 in ISO/IEC 9797-1 [8]. Note that this scheme is widely used with
the block cipher DES (which has n = 64 and k = 56) in environments where ob-
taining 2n/2 = 232 message/MAC pairs is deemed infeasible. However, it seems
that a security proof for this scheme does not exist. Nevertheless, since it closely
resembles EMAC, heuristically one might expect a similar level of provable se-
curity.
This MAC scheme again uses a pair of keys (K1, K2) where K1 and K2 are
both block cipher keys, i.e. they contain k bits. A message D is first padded and
split into a sequence of q n-bit blocks: D1, D2, . . . , Dq. The MAC computation
is as follows:
H1 = eK1(D1),
Hi = eK1(Di ⊕Hi−1), (2 ≤ i ≤ q − 1), and
MAC = eK1(dK2(eK1(Dq ⊕Hq−1))).
As summarised in [8], the best known forgery attack against the ANSI retail
MAC has complexity [0, 2n/2, 1] and the best-known key recovery attack has
complexity [2k+1, 2n/2, 0] — note that one attraction of ARMAC is that it does
not appear to be subject to meet-in-the-middle attacks.
6.3 Comparisons
We compare the three ‘new’ MAC algorithms, i.e. XCBC, OMAC and TMAC,
with the two longer-established schemes with respect to two different criteria:
efficiency and security.
Efficiency can be further sub-divided into two different categories: key length,
and the number of block cipher operations required to compute the MAC for a
message. The key lengths for the five MAC schemes considered here are given in
Table 1.
Table 1. Key lengths
XCBC TMAC OMAC EMAC ARMAC
k + 2n k + n k 2k 2k
The number of block cipher operations (encryptions or decryptions) required
to compute the MAC for a message is specified in Table 2. Note that it is assumed
that EMAC and ARMAC are used with the “always add a ‘1’ and then as many
zeros as necessary” padding method, which is standardised as padding method
2 in ISO/IEC 9797-1 [8].
Table 2. Computational complexity (block cipher operations)
No. of data bits (`) XCBC TMAC OMAC EMAC ARMAC
(t− 1)n < ` < tn t t t t+ 1 t+ 2
` = tn t t t t+ 2 t+ 3
From Table 2 it should be clear that XCBC, TMAC and OMAC all offer
workload advantages over EMAC and ARMAC. This workload advantage is
slightly increased by the fact that XCBC, TMAC and OMAC only require one
block cipher key ‘set up’ per MAC computation, whereas EMAC and OMAC
require two — the difference this makes depends on the block cipher in use.
However, these advantages are probably insignificant for messages that are more
than a few blocks long, and even for short messages they are unlikely to be a
major issue; banking networks have been using ARMAC with a relatively slow
block cipher such as DES for many years for very large numbers of messages,
using relatively primitive hardware.
We sub-divide the security comparison into three sub-categories, covering
forgery attacks, key recovery attacks and partial key recovery attacks. The com-
plexities of forgery attacks against the five MAC schemes considered here are
specified in Table 3.
Table 3. Forgery attack complexities
XCBC TMAC OMAC EMAC ARMAC
[0,2n/2+1,0] [0,2n/2+1,0] [0,2n/2+1,0] [0,2n/2,1] [0,2n/2,1]
The complexities of key recovery attacks are specified in Table 4. Note that
this table does not take account of the fact that the complexities of the second
attacks for XCBC, TMAC and OMAC require no significant storage, whereas
the second attack against EMAC requires around O(2k) storage.
Table 4. Key recovery attack complexities
XCBC TMAC OMAC EMAC ARMAC
[2k,2n/2+1,0] [2k,2n/2+1,0] [2k,2n/2+1,0] [2k+1,2n/2,0] [2k+1,2n/2,0]
[2k+1,d(k + 2n)/ne,0] [2k+1,d(k + n)/ne,0] [2k+1,dk/ne,0] [s.2k,d2k/ne,0]
Finally, the complexities of partial key recovery attacks (where they exist)
are specified in Table 5.
Table 5. Partial key recovery attack complexities
XCBC TMAC OMAC EMAC ARMAC
— [0,2n/2+1,0] [0,2n/2+1,0] — —
[0,2n,2n]
7 Conclusions
It should be clear from the analysis above that, in terms of security, XCBC,
TMAC and OMAC offer no significant advantage by comparison with EMAC and
ARMAC. Moreover, in some cases, they would appear to be weaker, although the
most significant weaknesses of TMAC and OMAC might be avoided by changing
the key derivation procedure1. Unfortunately, such changes invalidate the proofs
1 Note that the reference to weaknesses should not be interpreted as implying that
these schemes are ‘weak’ — the existing security proofs establish their robustness as
long as 2n/2 MACs are not available to an attacker and k is sufficiently large (e.g.
k ≥ 128).
of security for these schemes, and a simple proposed change of this type has been
heavily criticised. It would be interesting to investigate other possible changes
to the key derivation process.
Nevertheless, XCBC, TMAC and OMAC do offer a small practical advantage
in terms of a modest reduction in the number of block cipher operations, although
this is unlikely to be significant in most applications. In summary, there does not
appear to be a compelling case for standardising these new CBC-MAC schemes.
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